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Abstract
This paper analyses the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage
taxes using a simple political economy model with internationally mobile and
immobile ﬁrms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries reduce
their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax, either when preferences for
public goods increase or when a rising share of capital is employed in multina-
tional ﬁrms. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 OECD
countries for the period 1980 through 2001. The results of the empirical analysis
support our central hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread concern in public policy that increasing capital market inte-
gration is eroding the traditional role of the tax system in equalizing the (after-tax)
distribution of income. These concerns are based on the diﬀerential development of
wage and capital tax rates over the last decades. Data for the member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show, for exam-
ple, that in the early 1980s the statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts was 50 percent
higher, on average, than the labour tax wedge for the average worker. By the year 2000,
however, the two tax rates had become roughly equal (see Table 1). Related evidence
shows that, on average, European Union (EU) member states have reduced their re-
liance on capital taxes and increased the share of labour taxes in total tax revenues
during the past 30 years (Eurostat 1998, 2005). These developments underlie several
current EU policy initiatives, which aim to increase the eﬀective taxation of capital
income and, in particular, corporate proﬁts (European Commission 1997, 2001).1
In the aggregate, these trends are in line with the results of the tax competition lit-
erature, which predict a reduction in the relative reliance on corporate taxes as the
optimal response to increased capital market integration (see Wilson, 1999 for a sur-
vey). Table 1 also shows, however, that the policy responses to increased capital market
integration have been rather diverse, even among the relatively homogeneous group of
OECD countries. In some countries (Austria, Finland, Greece and Sweden) the ratio
of capital to labour taxes has fallen by more than 50 per cent during the period 1980
through 2001, whereas the same ratio has stayed virtually constant in the United States
and it has even increased in Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. Moreover, large diﬀerences
in the pattern of capital and labour taxation remain. In 2001, for example, the corpo-
rate tax rate was only 63% of the wage tax rate for an average worker in Sweden, but
183% of the wage tax rate in Japan. Very little theoretical work has been devoted so
far to explain these substantial and persistent cross-country diﬀerences in the relative
reliance on capital and labour taxation.2
1For a detailed survey of the development of corporate taxation in the OECD countries since the
1980s, see Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002).
2The only robust link that has been derived in the theoretical tax competition literature is that
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Table 1: Taxation of corporate and labour income in the OECD
statutory corporate tax wedge tax ratio
income tax rate (τ)a on labour (t)b (τ/t)
Country 1980 2001 1980 2001 1980 2001
Australia 50.0 30.0 18.3 18.8 2.73 1.60
Austria 61.3 34.0 29.9 36.7 2.05 0.93
Belgium 48.0 40.2 41.6 47.9 1.15 0.84
Canada 44.8 35.6 18.3 25.4 2.45 1.40
Denmark 40.0 32.0 37.0 37.1 1.08 0.86
Finland 60.2 29.0 37.4 42.4 1.61 0.68
Germany 62.2 38.3 36.1 41.8 1.72 0.92
Greece 43.4 37.5 17.4 35.8 2.49 1.05
Ireland 45.0 10.0 27.9 19.3 1.61 0.52
Italy 36.3 40.3 43.6 40.7 0.83 0.99
Japan 52.6 40.9 14.3 22.3 3.68 1.83
Luxembourg 45.5 37.5 29.1 22.7 1.56 1.65
Netherlands 48.0 35.0 43.8 37.6 1.10 0.93
New Zealand 45.0 33.0 20.0 18.1 2.25 1.82
Norway 50.8 28.0 37.3 31.9 1.36 0.88
Spain 33.0 35.0 34.6 34.5 0.95 1.01
Sweden 60.4 28.0 46.7 44.8 1.29 0.63
United Kingdom 52.0 30.0 31.4 23.9 1.66 1.26
United States 49.6 39.3 29.4 24.0 1.69 1.64
OECD average 48.8 33.3 31.3 31.9 1.75 1.13
coeﬀ. of variation 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.40 0.35
Sources: Corporate taxes: IFS tax data (www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication id=3210);
own calculations. Labour tax wedge: OECD, Taxing wages (new.sourceoecd.org).
a Including typical local income taxes and supplementary charges. In countries with more
than one tax rate, the manufacturing rate was chosen.
b Average tax rate faced by a manufacturing employee on average income. Includes personal
income taxes, social security contributions and payroll taxes.
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Against this background, the present focuses on the eﬀects that country-speciﬁc vari-
ables have on the mix of wage and proﬁt taxation under conditions of capital market
integration. A distinguishing feature of our paper is that all hypotheses are derived from
a simple, yet fully speciﬁed model and are then taken directly to the empirical tests.
Our theoretical analysis draws on the traditional model of capital tax competition, but
it also incorporates some of the recent developments related to the taxation of multina-
tional ﬁrms.3 We introduce a simple political-economy model with two types of voters,
workers and capitalists. Workers can avoid taxation by working in the shadow econ-
omy, whereas capital owners of multinational (but not domestic) ﬁrms can escape high
taxes by moving activities abroad. The model is simple enough to derive reduced-form
expressions for the optimal wage and proﬁt taxes in the political-economic equilibrium,
ensuring sharp comparative static eﬀects. Our theoretical model incorporates several
of the core ﬁndings of the capital tax competition literature. In addition, it predicts
that countries reduce their corporate tax rates, relative to the wage tax, either when
preferences for public goods increase or when a rising share of capital is employed in
multinational ﬁrms.
In a second step, we test the predicted relationships using a panel data set from 23
OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2001. The empirical analysis supports
our central theoretical results. In particular, the share of government consumption
(excluding transfers and social security contributions) is found to have a robust negative
eﬀect on the ratio of corporate taxation to wage taxation. Moreover, we proxy the share
of multinational ﬁrms in an economy by the value added in the manufacturing sector,
relative to the value added in the service sector. This measure for the potential mobility
of the corporate tax base is also found to have a negative and signiﬁcant impact on the
ratio of corporate taxation to wage taxation.
Our empirical analysis relates to several recent studies which regress the mix of proﬁt
and wage taxation on various measures of capital market integration (Rodrik 1997;
Bretschger and Hettich 2002; Slemrod 2004; Winner 2005).4 Like these studies, our
small countries will face a higher elasticity of the capital tax base and will therefore, on average, have
a smaller capital tax rate than their larger neighbours. See Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).
3Examples are Mintz and Smart (2004) and Kind et al. (2005). For an empirical account of the
rise in FDI and multinational ﬁrm activity over the last two decades, see Markusen (2002, ch. 1).
4A diﬀerent, and complementary, strand in the recent empirical literature tests for the presence of
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results support the general prediction of the tax competition literature that increased
capital market integration tends to shift the burden of factor taxation from mobile
capital to less mobile labour.5 Our results go beyond these earlier studies, however, by
relating the mix of factor taxation to a number of country-speciﬁc variables derived
from our theoretical model. Speciﬁcally, the share of multinational ﬁrms (proxied by
the sectoral composition of output) can be interpreted as a country-speciﬁc measure of
the exposure to capital market integration, whereas the share of public consumption
expenditures points to the importance of domestic factors in explaining the observed
tax mix. We argue that these results oﬀer some explanation for the persistence of cross-
country diﬀerences in the ratio of capital taxation to wage taxation under conditions
where the integration of OECD countries into world capital markets is almost complete.
Section 2 of this paper develops the model and derives its comparative static eﬀects.
These serve as theoretical hypotheses for the ensuing empirical analysis, which is de-
scribed in Section 3. Section 4 compares our results with those obtained in related
work. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple model of the optimal direct tax mix
2.1 The framework
We consider a small open economy with two groups of consumers, capitalists and
workers. Capitalists receive only capital income, whereas workers receive only wage
income. The total population is normalised to unity, and is divided between µ workers
and (1 − µ) capitalists. We assume µ > 0.5, i.e. workers are in the majority and will
strategic interaction between tax-setting governments. See, for example, Besley et al. (2001), Devereux
et al. (2002), or Brueckner (2003) for an overview.
5This contradicts earlier studies in the political science literature, which found that higher capital
mobility is associated with higher revenues derived from capital taxation. That literature argued that
the eﬀects of capital tax competition are more than oﬀset by an increased demand for government
redistribution, in order to insulate individuals from globalisation-related risks (the so-called ‘compen-
sation hypothesis’). More recent work in the political science literature has, however, conﬁrmed the
negative eﬀect of capital market integration on the rate of capital taxation. See Swank and Steinmo
(2002) and the references cited there.
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determine the political-economic equilibrium in our model. Capitalists receive income
from two representative ﬁrms, one domestic and one multinational. The capital stocks
in the domestic and the multinational ﬁrm are kD and kM , respectively, where the total
capital endowment is denoted by K ≡ kD+kM . Capital cannot be shifted between the
domestic and the international ﬁrm.6
The representative capitalist in the small country faces an exogenous world interest
rate, normalised to one. Capital income in the home country is taxed by a proportional
corporation tax levied at rate τ . The multinational ﬁrm, but not the domestic ﬁrm,
can relocate part of its capital to a foreign country for tax reasons, where it is taxed at
the exogenously given ‘world’ tax rate τ¯ < τ . Hence, the domestic country is a high-
tax country relative to the rest of the world.7 We assume here that the relocation of
capital has real eﬀects, reducing the capital stock in the home country.8 In doing so, the
multinational ﬁrm incurs costs that are a convex (for simplicity, quadratic) function of
the share of relocated capital. Denoting the share of capital in the multinational ﬁrm
that is moved abroad by βC , the relocation costs are FC = αCkM(βC)2/2, where αC is
a net of tax cost parameter. The after-tax income of the capitalist is then
IC =
[
kD +
(
1− βC) kM] (1− τ) + βCkM (1− τ¯)− αCkM(βC)2
2
, (1)
where the ﬁrst two terms are the after-tax incomes in the home and the foreign country,
respectively, and the last term gives the (net-of-tax) cost of relocating operations.
The owners of multinational ﬁrms choose the share βC of their foreign operations.
Maximisation of (1) with respect to βC yields βC = (τ − τ¯) /αC . Incorporating this
proﬁt-maximising behaviour and introducing kM = sK to describe the multinational
6This assumption, which is made in most of the existing public ﬁnance literature, implies that the
ﬁrms’ choice between a national and a multinational form is not systematically aﬀected by taxes. For
a recent analysis in which ﬁrms change their organizational structures in response to long-term tax
incentives, see Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2005).
7Alternatively, the ‘world tax rate’ can be interpreted as the rate oﬀered internationally by low-tax
countries.
8An alternative interpretation is that multinational ﬁrms can shelter proﬁt income from domestic
tax by thin capitalization, borrowing money as necessary from an aﬃliate in a tax haven (Mintz and
Smart, 2004).
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sector’s share of the total capital stock, the domestic capital stock is
κ = kD + (1− βC)kM = K
[
1− s(τ − τ¯)
2
αC
]
. (2)
Turning to workers, their gross wage depends on the amount of capital operating in the
home country. Speciﬁcally, let the gross wage be a linear function of capital employed
domestically (by national and by multinational ﬁrms), and denote by 0 < ρ < 1 the
proportionality factor with which this capital stock aﬀects the gross wage. Hence
ω = ρ κ = ρK
[
1− s (τ − τ¯)
2
αC
]
. (3)
The dependence of the wage rate on the domestic capital stock gives the voting majority
of workers an incentive to choose a mix of wage and proﬁt taxes, rather than rely
exclusively on proﬁt taxation.
The second tax in the model is a linear tax on wages, levied at rate t. Workers can avoid
the wage tax by working in the shadow economy, but this is associated with a dead-
weight cost. We formulate the tax avoidance decision of workers in an analogous way
as that for multinational ﬁrms and denote by βW the share of work income relocated
to the shadow economy. The deadweight cost of this operation is FW = αWω(βW )2/2.
The net income of a representative worker is then, using (3)
IW = ρK
[
1− s (τ − τ¯)
αC
] [
1− t(1− βW )− α
W (βW )2
2
]
. (4)
Maximisation with respect to βW gives βW = t/αW . Substituting into (4) yields the
maximised after-tax income of each worker as
IW∗ = ρK
[
1− s (τ − τ¯)
αC
] [
1− t
(
1− t
2αW
)]
. (5)
The share of capital income earned domestically forms the base of the corporation tax,
whereas the labour tax falls on all wage income that is legally earned. Recalling that
there are µ workers and 1 − µ capitalists in the economy, total tax revenue (which
equals per-capita tax revenue, since the population is normalised to unity) is given by
T = K
[
1− s (τ − τ¯)
αC
] [
tµρ
(
1− t
αW
)
+ τ(1− µ)
]
. (6)
A representative worker derives utility from her maximised after-tax income IW∗ and a
quasi-private public good. The assumption that there are no economies of scale in the
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provision of the public good makes the results of the analysis comparable for countries
of diﬀerent size, as will be further discussed below. Both the private and the public
good enter the worker’s utility function linearly and the marginal beneﬁt of the public
good is assumed to be constant, and denoted by γ.9 With these speciﬁcations, the
utility of a representative worker is UW = I∗ + γT, which by use of (5) and (6) can be
written as
UW = K
(
1− s (τ − τ¯)
αC
){
ρ
[
1− t
(
1− t
2αW
)]
+ γ
[
tµρ
(
1− t
αW
)
+ τ(1− µ)
]}
.
Given that the median voter in our economy is a worker, the equilibrium policy max-
imises UW with respect to the two tax instruments τ and t. In a ﬁrst step the optimal
wage tax is derived as
t∗ =
αW (γµ− 1)
(2γµ− 1) . (7)
The equilibrium wage tax is thus linearly rising in the cost parameter αW . The wage
tax will be positive, if the marginal beneﬁt from this tax, γµ (the value of one unit
of the public good, multiplied by the share of workers on whom the tax is imposed),
exceeds the marginal cost (which equals one). In the following we assume that this
condition is met and t∗ > 0 in the optimum.
In a second step the optimal corporation tax rate is derived using (7). This yields
τ ∗ =
αC
2s
+
τ¯
2
− ρ
2γ(1− µ)
[
1 +
αW (γµ− 1)2
2(2γµ− 1)
]
. (8)
The corporate tax rate consists of two parts. The ﬁrst, positive part describes the
beneﬁts, from the perspective of workers, of taxing capital income. This eﬀect will
be large when the share of the mobile, multinational tax base s is low, or when it is
unattractive for multinationals to shift capital abroad, due to either high foreign taxes
τ¯ or a high cost parameter αC . The second, negative part describes the incentive for
9Note that interior solutions for optimal tax rates are obtained in our model, despite the linearity
of the objective function in both private income and public goods. This is because the excess burden
of taxation is strictly convex in each of the two tax rates. In principle, γ could be allowed to vary,
displaying decreasing marginal utility. This would not alter the fundamental insights that follow from
the analysis, but would complicate the model substantially.
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workers to subsidise domestic capital, in order to raise gross wages.10 This incentive is
rising in ρ. The capital tax will be positive if, in the valuation of workers, the revenue
gains from the taxation of capital income exceed the induced reduction in gross wages.
This is assumed in what follows.
2.2 Determinants of the equilibrium tax mix
In this section we derive the comparative static eﬀects of changes in the exogenous
parameters on the mix of wage and capital taxes that the working majority chooses
in equilibrium. In doing so we incorporate a number of basic insights from the theo-
retical literature on taxation in open economies, but we also derive some new results.
Throughout, we assume that both tax rates are strictly positive in equilibrium.
A ﬁrst and straightforward exercise is to determine the eﬀects of an increase in the
foreign (world) tax rate τ¯ . From (7) and (8) this unambiguously increases the relative
reliance on the corporation tax
∂(τ/t)
∂τ¯
=
1
2t
> 0. (9)
This simple comparative static eﬀect corresponds to upward-sloping best response func-
tions in more complex models of interdependent tax-setting by regional governments.
The latter result underlies virtually all of the literature on capital tax competition (cf.
Wilson, 1999).
Next, we consider the eﬀects of market integration. An increase in the relocation cost
parameter αC changes the equilibrium tax mix by.
∂(τ/t)
∂αC
=
1
2st
> 0. (10)
In our model increased capital market integration is given by a fall in the relocation cost
parameter αC . As seen from (10), the eﬀects of lower shifting costs make the aggregate
capital tax base more elastic and reduce the equilibrium tax on this base. Since the
wage tax is not aﬀected, economic integration also reduces the relative reliance on
10Similar eﬀects are present in more complex models of wage determination. Fuest and Huber
(2000), for example, show in a wage bargaining model that investment subsidies are preferred to
direct employment subsidies, because they reduce the bargaining position of trade unions.
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proﬁt taxes. Again, this is one of the eﬀects that are frequently analysed in the tax
competition literature (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Kind et al., 2005).11
Changes in either the world (average) tax rate or the degree of capital market integra-
tion will aﬀect all countries in similar ways. The latter holds at least for the OECD
countries, which have lifted all remaining capital controls in the early 1990s and where
further capital market integration reﬂects general improvements in information tech-
nologies. Our model shows, however, that changing the country-speciﬁc share of capital
in the multinational sector gives similar predictions as increased capital market inte-
gration. Raising s while holding the total capital stock constant yields
∂(τ/t)
∂s
=
−αC
s2t
< 0. (11)
A higher proportion of internationally mobile capital raises the average elasticity of
the corporate tax base, even when αC is held constant. In equilibrium this lowers the
tax rate on capital, relative to the wage tax.
A well-known result is that small countries levy lower capital tax rates than their larger
neighbours (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). This result also extends to settings where
countries tax proﬁts from FDI (Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999). We can relate our result in
eq. (11) above to this literature, if we assume that the share of the multinational sector
is larger in small countries. One reason for this could be that the motive to engage
in horizontal (market-seeking) FDI becomes more important when the ﬁrm’s home
market is small. We will examine this relationship in our empirical analysis below.
A further important determinant are the median voter’s preferences for public goods,
as captured by the parameter γ. This parameter aﬀects the two taxes in our model by
∂τ
∂γ
=
ρ
[
2(2γµ− 1)2 − αW (γµ− 1)(3γµ− 1)]
4γ2(1− µ)(2γµ− 1)2t ;
∂t
∂γ
=
αWµ
(2γµ− 1)2 > 0. (12)
A stronger preference for the public good will unambiguously raise the wage tax t, but
the same need not be true for the corporation tax. The reason for the latter result is that
an increase in τ will raise revenues from the corporation tax but, through the negative
eﬀect on wages, simultaneously reduces labour tax revenues. If the cost of working in
11Similar eﬀects arise in models of capital and wage taxation when capital is internationally mobile
and the number of countries competing for capital is increased (Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991).
9
the shadow economy for the worker (αW ) is suﬃciently large, implying – realistically
– that most of tax revenues is raised from wage taxes, the negative repercussions of a
capital tax increase on wage tax collections will be strong. Intuitively, in this case the
excess burden associated with corporate taxation rises more steeply than the excess
burden of wage taxation. Hence a higher tax revenue requirement will be predominantly
met by higher wage taxes, whereas the corporation tax remains largely unaﬀected or
may even be reduced.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of changing the share of workers µ. This aﬀects taxes by
∂τ
∂µ
=
−ρ{2(2γµ− 1)2 + αW (γµ− 1) [(γµ− 1)(2γµ− 1) + 2γ2(1− µ)µ]}
4γ(1− µ)2(2γµ− 1)2 < 0,
∂t
∂µ
=
αWγ
(2γµ− 1)2 > 0 . (13)
Hence our model has the somewhat surprising implication that an increase in the share
of workers will unambiguously increase the reliance on the wage tax, relative to the
corporation tax. This eﬀect is driven by changes in the size of tax bases: a rise in µ
increases the base of the wage tax while decreasing the base of the corporation tax.
Changing the number of workers and capitalists has no further repercussions on the
factor tax mix chosen in the political-economic equilibrium, due to our assumption
that the political power is exclusively in the hands of workers.
The comparative static results from our theoretical model are summarised in
Proposition 1: The following changes in exogenous parameters reduce the rate of
the corporation tax, relative to the rate of wage taxation:
(a) a lower world average tax rate (τ¯);
(b) a fall in the costs of moving corporate activities abroad (αC);
(c) a higher share of capital income earned by multinational ﬁrms (s);
(d) an increase in the preference for public goods (γ), if the costs of shifting domestic
income to the shadow economy is suﬃciently high;
(e) a rise in the share of wage income (µ).
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3 Empirical results
The stylised model described above has allowed us to derive rigorously a number of
comparative static eﬀects, which represent theoretical hypotheses on country-speciﬁc
determinants for the optimal mix of wage and proﬁt taxation. In this section we discuss
how these predictions can be tested with available data and present our results.
3.1 Data
The data requirements for our analysis, which tests a relatively wide range of pre-
dictions, are substantial. Therefore we focus on a panel of 23 OECD countries, for
which the relevant data can be obtained. Our analysis covers the time period from
1980 to 2001. This period was characterised by the removal of the remaining capital
market controls among the developed countries, and by a rapid growth of foreign direct
investment (see Markusen, 2002, ch. 1).
3.1.1 Tax measures
In constructing the data set for the empirical analysis, a ﬁrst and important choice
that needs to be made is how to measure tax rates. For convenience, implicit tax rates
are often computed, where tax revenues from a given source are divided by the corre-
sponding tax base obtained from national accounts statistics. The advantage of that
approach is that such data are widely available, and that they include the eﬀects of
all aspects of complicated tax systems. For corporate income however, they also have
important drawbacks. As documented in Devereux and Klemm (2004), the movement
over time of revenue-based tax measures can have little in common with changes in tax
laws. Instead they are mainly driven by the business cycle, historical eﬀects, such as
accumulated losses, and many other factors that are impossible to control for econo-
metrically. They are therefore not likely to be useful in the context of a model that
attempts to explain tax setting behaviour, rather than predict tax revenues.12
12This expectation is conﬁrmed by the empirical results of Slemrod (2004), who tests alternative
speciﬁcations using either statutory corporate tax rates or a corporate tax measure based on col-
lected revenue. Slemrod’s regressions for the revenue-based measure mostly yield coeﬃcients that are
11
In order to model corporate income tax rates, we therefore use measures exclusively
based on tax laws. In particular, we use the statutory tax rate, carefully adding any
sub-federal taxes or averages thereof as well as any supplementary charges. While this
measure does not include the eﬀect of tax laws on the tax base, such as the value of
investment allowances, it is still a core determinant of investment decisions.13
A symmetric treatment of wage taxes would imply using the top marginal income tax
rate, adding in the rate of social security contributions and, where applicable, payroll
taxes. This approach has, however, one important disadvantage: in the early 1980s top
rates were extremely high in a number of countries. As the threshold for such rates was
also high, they were irrelevant for the majority of the population, except a few high
income earners. They are therefore not useful for testing a model in which the median
voter determines the policy outcome. What is needed instead is a typical tax rate faced
by an average worker, as provided by the OECD (2005). This measure gives the tax
rate faced by a manufacturing worker on the mean salary, and includes social security
and payroll taxes.
3.1.2 Explanatory variables
Turning to the explanatory variables, we proxy the preference for public goods (γ) by
government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP.14 For the share of workers
in the economy (µ) we use wages and salaries divided by GDP. This measure is used
because it is likely to proxy not only for the quantity of workers, but also for their
quality. For the world tax rate (τ¯), we use the unweighted average of corporate tax
rates in a sample of 70 countries. Details on the precise deﬁnition and the source of
insigniﬁcant, or of unexpected sign. Cf. also footnote 5.
13One of the most commonly used tax measures is the (microeconomic) eﬀective average tax rate,
developed by Devereux and Griﬃth (2003). This measure is equivalent to a weighted average of the
eﬀective marginal tax rate on an investment that just earns a net rate of return equal to the going
interest rate, and the statutory tax rate. The weight of the statutory tax rate in this measure rises
with the proﬁtability of the underlying investment project.
14Note that this measure does not include transfers, such as most social security expenditure. If the
latter were included, a positive relationship between public expenditure and labour taxes would be
implicit in our data, as social security contributions are often tied to expenditure by social security
funds.
12
these data are given in the appendix (Table A.1).
A core variable in previous empirical studies has been the cost of international capital
relocation (αC), or the ‘openness’ of the economy. A traditional measure for this variable
is the share of imports and exports in GDP (see, e.g. Rodrik, 1997). Note, however,
that using this proxy in an analysis of the determinants of factor taxes implicitly
assumes that trade ﬂows and capital ﬂows are complements. For this assumption no
(unambiguous) theoretical foundation exists in trade theory. An alternative measure
is a qualitative index of capital market restrictions, as developed in Quinn (1997)
and used, for example, in the analyses of Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Swank
and Steinmo (2002). For the OECD countries in our sample this measure exhibits,
however, little variation during the last 10 years, as capital markets have been almost
completely liberalised throughout this period. Despite their shortcomings, we consider
both variables as regressors in the empirical analysis.
Importantly, previous studies have been based on measures of ‘openness’ that relate to
the overall mobility of (portfolio) capital.15 When, as in our analysis, the focus lies on
the taxation of corporate proﬁts, it is preferable to use a measure of openness that is
directly related to foreign direct investment. Our theoretical analysis has suggested that
a rise in the share of the multinational capital stock (s) will have similar eﬀects as a fall
in the relocation costs of capital. It is however diﬃcult to obtain a measure of the capital
stock owned by multinational ﬁrms, as this would need to include their entire capital
stock, and not just the portion relocated abroad. Nevertheless, it appears likely that
the stock of foreign direct investment is related to the capital stock of multinationals,
and can therefore be used as a proxy. However, as our theoretical analysis has shown,
the size of outward FDI is determined by the share of capital in multinational ﬁrms
(sK = kM), multiplied by the share of capital that is moved abroad (βC). Since this
share is in turn positively related to the corporate tax rate, the relationship between
the domestic tax rate and the size of foreign direct investment is ambiguous a priori.
Moreover, the fact that FDI is an endogenous variable in our analysis needs to be
allowed for econometrically.
To overcome these diﬃculties, we employ the industrial structure of the economy as a
15This also applies to the study by Winner (2005) where capital market openness is proxied by a
low savings-investment correlation.
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proxy for the share of the multinational sector. Speciﬁcally, we use the ratio of value
added in the service sector to value added in manufacturing as an indicator for a low
share of multinationals in the economy. The use of this proxy is based on statistics
collected by the OECD (2001) for a subsample of the countries covered in our analy-
sis. These data show, for both inward and outward FDI, that in most countries the
turnover of multinational ﬁrms as a share of total sectoral output is substantially larger
in manufacturing than in the service sector (see Table A.2 in the appendix). There are
two main reasons why this link between the sectoral composition of output and the
share of multinational ﬁrms can be expected. First, a substantial part of the tertiary
sector are locally provided services, including retail trade, transport and storage and
community social services, which do not lend themselves to a multinational organiza-
tional form. Secondly, multinational ﬁrms are known to be particularly important in
sectors characterised by high levels of R&D and high levels of product diﬀerentiation
(Markusen 2002, ch. 1). While these characteristics also apply to certain parts of the
service sector, they are more widespread, on average, in manufacturing.16
Finally, we include the level of GDP (measured in purchasing power parities) as a
measure of country size. This follows the results in the theoretical literature on capital
tax competition that smaller countries tend face a higher elasticity of the capital tax
base, other things being equal, and will thus have a lower ratio of corporate to wage
taxes in equilibrium.17 Table 2 summarises how the predictions from our theoretical
model are tested empirically. Some descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3.
16A potential disadvantage of our measure is that the sectoral composition of output may change
over the economic cycle. There seems to be no literature addressing this question directly, but related
studies suggest that this eﬀect is not very pronounced. Jimeno (1992) argues that sectoral shocks
have only limited aggregate eﬀects. As he considers sectors at a more disaggregated level, this is
consistent with assuming no major changes in the relationship between service and manufacturing
sectors. Similarly, Ghosh and Wolf (1997) argue that geographical shocks are more important than
sectoral shocks in explaining the US aggregate economic climate. In any event, time ﬁxed eﬀects will
allow for any common cyclical eﬀects in our regression analysis.
17The empirical link between country size and the level of corporation tax is stressed by several
authors. See, for example, Grubert and Mutti (2000) and Sørensen (2000).
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Table 2: Empirical implementation of the model
parameter in label in predicted
theoretical regression sign on description
model analysis τ/t
τ¯ world tax (+) average corporation tax in world sample
γ pub cons (–) government consumption / GDP
µ wage share (–) wages + salaries / GDP
αc trade share (–) (imports + exports)/ GDP
cap controls (–)a index of capital control measures
s service share (+) value added in services/manufacturing
GDP (+) level of domestic product
βC × s FDI stock (+, –) outward FDI stock/GDP
a A low value of the index indicates strict capital controls (cf. Table A.1).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
variable obser- mean median standard min. max.
vations deviation
tax ratio 418 1.347 1.236 .612 .272 3.745
world tax 418 .358 .353 .039 .301 .411
pub cons 418 .199 .195 .037 .129 .272
wage share 392 .442 .450 .055 .248 .555
trade share 242 .159 .107 .143 .007 .852
cap controls 318 3.431 3.5 .609 2 4
service share 387 3.506 3.386 .999 1.886 7.970
GDP 418 .753 .193 1.479 .004 10.049
FDI stock 418 .725 .592 .468 .160 2.895
See deﬁnitions in Table A.1.
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Figure 1: Average corporate income tax rate and wage tax rate over time
Note: The average was calculated on those 19 countries, for which uninterrupted data are
available from 1980-2001.
3.2 Results
To summarise the facts to be explained, Figure 1 plots both the statutory corporate
income tax rate and the wage tax for the average worker (as discussed in 3.1.1 above)
over time.18 The ﬁgure shows that corporate income taxes have fallen substantially
since 1980, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Average wage taxes on the
other hand have been changing without a clear trend and within a relatively narrow
range of 30 to 35 per cent.
To reveal the relationship between the ratio of corporate to labour taxes and the ex-
ogenous parameters described above, we use standard panel data methods. Speciﬁcally
we run (OLS) regressions of the form
(τ/t)it = Xitβ + ηi + ζt + εit ,
18A matrix of charts displaying the development of the ratios of corporate to wage tax rates in the
individual countries covered by our analysis is found in the appendix (Figure A.1).
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where (τ/t)it is the tax ratio in country i at time t, Xit are explanatory variables, ηi
and ζt are ﬁxed country and time eﬀects and εit is a possibly heteroskedastic error.
An important feature of our empirical analysis is that we incorporate country ﬁxed
eﬀects in all regressions (except for one sensitivity test). This procedure follows from
a rigorous interpretation of our theoretical comparative static results: they derive hy-
pothesis on how the tax mix adjusts within a given country when one of the exogenous
variables changes. A cross-country interpretation of these eﬀects would thus be per-
mitted only, if our model incorporated all variables that explain diﬀerences in the tax
mix between countries. Clearly, this cannot be claimed for our simple model. The same
point can also be stated econometrically. Since it is likely that we have omitted im-
portant variables, a regression that does not use ﬁxed country eﬀects will yield biased
estimates, if the omitted variables are correlated in some way with the variables that
are included in our regression. These expectations are conﬁrmed by standard Haus-
man tests, which suggest that ﬁxed country eﬀects should be used consistently in our
analysis. The estimates derived from our speciﬁcation with country ﬁxed eﬀects will
then be unbiased, if the unobserved variables do not change over time.
The results from our main set of regressions are summarised in Table 4. In these
regressions we have also included time ﬁxed eﬀects. Note, however, that using time
eﬀects does not permit us to incorporate the world average tax rate. As this is the
same for all countries, it would be perfectly collinear with time eﬀects, and estimation
would not be possible. The world average tax rate is therefore included in a second set
of regressions, to be presented below.
Column (1) of Table 4 relates the endogenous variable to parameters of the domestic
economy only. The coeﬃcient of the public consumption variable is signiﬁcant and has
the expected negative sign. Moreover this relationship is a robust one, as the further
regressions show. This provides evidence that an increase in government consumption
changes the tax mix in the direction of a higher share of wage taxation, as predicted
in Proposition 1(d). The relationship is important also in size, as a coeﬃcient of about
4 implies that an increase in the government consumption share of GDP by one per-
centage point will reduce the ratio of tax rates by 4 percentage points. Recall also that
transfers and social security expenditures are not included in our measure of public
consumption (cf. footnote 14); hence the relationship found in our regression analysis is
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Table 4: Estimation results - Baseline case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dependent variable corporate income tax /wage tax (τ/t)
country eﬀects
√ √ √
—
√ √
year eﬀects
√ √ √ √ √ √
IV — — — —
√
—
pub cons -3.900∗∗ -3.565∗∗ -6.590∗∗∗ -7.639∗∗∗ -12.134 -4.200∗∗∗
(1.552) (1.507) (1.598) (1.157) (7.580) (1.499)
wage share 0.205 0.509 1.618 3.833∗∗∗ 0.080 0.504
(0.906) (0.960) (0.991) (0.574) (1.909) (0.751)
GDP 0.028 0.032 0.052∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.123 0.025
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.026) (0.220) (0.020)
trade share 0.176
(0.147)
cap controls 0.109∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.063)
FDI stock -4.694
(5.358)
service share 0.132∗∗∗
(0.022)
constant 2.406∗∗∗ 2.075∗∗∗ 2.020∗∗∗ 2.360∗∗∗ 4.941∗∗ 1.950∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.509) (0.493) (0.348) (2.236) (0.379)
observations 392 392 312 312 242 366
R-squared† 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.44 0.75 0.90
R-squared‡ 0.23 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.36
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate level of signiﬁcance (∗: 10%; ∗∗:
5%; ∗∗∗: 1%). The ﬁrst measure for R-squared (†) is given with country and time ﬁxed eﬀects
[except for column (4) which has only time eﬀects], the second measure (‡) excludes country
and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
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a non-trivial one. In contrast, the coeﬃcients of the wage share and GDP variables are
not signiﬁcant in the regression of column (1), and this generally remains true when
further (international) variables are added.
The regressions in columns (2) to (4) add the two main proxies for capital market
integration that have been used in previous literature. Column (2) incorporates the
share of commodity trade in GDP as an explanatory variable. This variable has an
unexpected positive sign, but the coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Hence our regression results suggest that trade openness is not a good proxy for capital
market openness. In column (3) we include instead Quinn’s (1997) measure of capital
controls. This measure is statistically signiﬁcant, but – recalling that an increase in the
index represents an opening of capital markets – the coeﬃcient has the wrong sign. This
result seemingly contradicts earlier ﬁndings by Quinn (1997) and Rodrik (1997), who
both found that a liberalisation of international capital controls reduces the corporate
tax rate. The apparent discrepancy is resolved by noting that our speciﬁcation in
column (3) uses country ﬁxed eﬀects. When these are eliminated, as in column (4),
the sign of the capital control variable is reversed, and now matches the theoretical
expectations and previous ﬁndings. Hence the conclusion is that Quinn’s capital control
variable is able to explain cross-country diﬀerences in the ratio of corporate to wage
taxation, but it is not well suited to predict country-speciﬁc changes in this ratio over
time. Proposition 1(b) is thus conﬁrmed only from a cross-country perspective.
Column (5) incorporates the outward stock of FDI as an explanatory variable. As we
have discussed above, this variable is endogenous and its eﬀect of this variable on the
mix of wage and proﬁt taxes is theoretically ambiguous (cf. Table 2). In order to deal
with the endogeneity and use this variable as a proxy for capital market integration,
we instrument this variable by Quinn’s capital control measure. Intuitively, this means
that we focus attention on the changes in FDI stocks which were caused by the opening
of capital markets, rather than tax rates. Speciﬁed in this way, a high FDI stock is
correlated with a low ratio of τ/t, indicating that the FDI stock is a further measure
for the ‘openness’ of an economy. However, this negative relationship is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Moreover, the ﬁndings with respect to this variable are subject to the
caveats about Quinn’s measure, as detailed above.
Our discussion so far has shown that none of the traditional measures of ‘openness’
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are a good predictor for the changes in the mix of wage and proﬁt taxation that
occur in a given country over time. Finally, column (6) employs the ratio of service
to manufacturing value added as an (inverse) proxy for the share of capital located in
internationally mobile ﬁrms. This variable has the expected sign, as an increase in the
share of relatively immobile capital in the service sector increases the relative reliance
on proﬁt taxation. The relationship is found to be signiﬁcant at the 1% level, thus
conﬁrming Proposition 1(c) of our theoretical model. Moreover, this result holds up
if any of the other measures of openness are added to the regression, or if the world
average tax rate is included (as reported below). At ﬁrst sight the small coeﬃcient
appears to suggest that this relationship is not very important economically. The ratio
of service to manufacturing value-added however increased on average by 8.3 percentage
points per year, implying – other things equal – an increase in the tax ratio by one
percentage point per year.19
We now include the world average tax rate as an explanatory variable. As discussed
above, this implies that we cannot employ year ﬁxed eﬀects. To still allow for some
common unexplained movement over time, we add a trend variable in these regressions.
It turns out that this time trend yields results that are quite similar to those with time
ﬁxed eﬀects. Another issue is that the world average tax rate is likely to be endogenous,
if all countries set their tax rates following the model introduced above. We deal with
this by calculating the average tax rate using a far larger sample of 70 countries.
Nevertheless some attenuation bias may remain. The results of these regressions are
given in Table 5.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 show that the average world tax rate is positively and
strongly correlated with the ratio of corporate to wage taxes in the OECD countries.
This conﬁrms the theoretical prediction in Proposition 1(a). While the large coeﬃcient
may seem surprising, it should be remembered that the dependent variable is a ratio
whose denominator is smaller than one. With an average wage tax rate in our sample
in the range of one third, a comparable increase in corporate tax rates abroad and
19This increase of 8.3 percentage points is caused by the relatively high ratio of service to manu-
facturing value added (equal to 3.5, on average). This represents an increase of on average just 0.4
percentage points in the ratio of value added in services over the sum of value added in services and
manufacturing.
20
Table 5: Estimation results with world tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dependent variable corporate income /wage tax (τ/t)
country eﬀects
√ √ √ √
pub cons -4.394∗∗∗ -4.325∗∗∗
(1.358) (1.270)
wage share 0.584
(0.716)
GDP 0.023 0.044∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017)
service share 0.138∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.015)
world tax 4.922∗∗∗ 3.325∗∗ 4.164∗∗∗ 3.486∗∗
(0.330) (1.409) (1.456) (1.464)
year -0.010 -0.017∗ -0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
constant -0.415∗∗∗ 20.031 34.334∗ 49.608∗∗
(0.117) (19.470) (20.391) (20.456)
observations 418 418 366 392
R-squared† 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.88
R-squared‡ 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.40
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate level of signiﬁcance (∗: 10%; ∗∗:
5%; ∗∗∗: 1%). First measure for R-squared (†) includes country ﬁxed eﬀects, second measure
(‡) excludes country ﬁxed eﬀects.
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domestically would thus lead to a coeﬃcient of about 3. The coeﬃcient is reduced
when a time trend is simultaneously introduced, but it remains signiﬁcant. Column
(3) adds in the variables that were discussed above. The results in this column show
that both the public consumption variable and the share of services in value added
remain highly signiﬁcant under the changed speciﬁcation. Moreover, their coeﬃcients
are almost unchanged, pointing to the robustness of our results with respect to these
core explanatory variables. At the same time the coeﬃcient of the world tax rate even
increases in size when the new variables are added. Finally, column (4) shows that when
the wage share variable is omitted, the absolute size of a country also turns signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Hence in this ﬁnal speciﬁcation our empirical analysis does lend some
support to the proposition that country size can be used as a proxy to measure the
exposure to international capital market integration. The composition of output as
a proxy for the share of multinationals also remains signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation,
however. In sum, the regression results in Table 5 show that the variables identiﬁed in
our simple model are indeed relevant in explaining the changes in the mix of corporate
and wage taxation that OECD countries have undertaken during the last two decades.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 all report heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors. It is however likely that the disturbances are also autocorrelated. To test and
allow for such autocorrelated disturbances, we use the Baltagi and Wu (1999) method
for allowing for AR(1) autocorrelated disturbances in panel data. Table 6 reports the
results for the main speciﬁcations. Overall they indicate that our ﬁndings are robust
to allowing for autocorrelated disturbances, even though the relationship between the
tax ratio and the preference for public goods is weakened. One diﬀerence to the results
presented above is that the coeﬃcient of the wage share variable is now signiﬁcant at
the 5 per cent level. The positive coeﬃcient of this variable contradicts our theoretical
prediction in Proposition 1(e). One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that our
simple political economy model leaves out some additional eﬀects, relating to changes
in the political power of labour in response to its factor share in the national economy.
Finally, the results suggest that autocorrelation is likely to be present in our data, as
is seen from consistently low locally best invariant test (LBI) statistics.
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Table 6: Estimation results using Baltagi and Wu (1999) method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dependent variable corporate income tax /wage tax (τ/t)
country eﬀects
√ √ √ √ √
year eﬀects
√ √ √ √
—
pub cons -1.585 -1.362 -3.272∗ -2.441∗ -2.023
(1.474) (1.489) (1.737) (1.449) (1.309)
wage share 1.792∗∗ 1.857∗∗ 2.124∗∗ 2.027∗∗ 1.834∗∗
(0.873) (0.875) (1.047) (0.800) (0.748)
GDP 0.034 0.047 0.019 0.058 0.051
(0.069) (0.070) (0.071) (0.067) (0.063)
trade share 0.202
(0.184)
cap controls 0.010
(0.043)
service share 0.118∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.044) (0.040)
world tax 5.316∗∗∗
(0.923)
constant 0.606∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ -1.348∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.071) (0.101) (0.050) (0.069)
observations 373 373 296 348 348
LBI statistic 0.59 0.37 0.76 0.51 0.51
number of cc 19 19 16 18 18
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate level of signiﬁcance (∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗:
1%).
23
4 Discussion
In this section we brieﬂy compare our empirical results to those obtained in previous
work on the subject. We conﬁne our comparison to the studies that include estimates
with ﬁxed country eﬀects; these are Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Slemrod (2004) and
Winner (2005).20 We have already argued above that using an index of capital controls,
as developed by Quinn (1997), allows us to explain cross-country diﬀerences in the ra-
tio of corporate to wage taxation, but it is not well suited to predict country-speciﬁc
changes in this ratio over time [cf. columns (2) and (4) of Table 4]. A similar result
is obtained in the analysis of Bretschger and Hettich (2002, Table 2), where the capi-
tal controls variable loses its signiﬁcance when country ﬁxed eﬀects are incorporated.
There are two possible reasons for these results. First, the index has remained virtually
constant over the last 10 years, and is thus unable to explain any changes in the ratio
of wage and capital taxes that have occurred during this period. Moreover the index of
capital controls is a discrete, qualitative measure that does not change smoothly and
may therefore not provide a good description of gradual changes in openness over time.
Similar comments apply when capital market integration is proxied by the share of
commodity trade in GDP. Both Bretschger and Hettich (2002, Table 2) and Slemrod
(2004, Table 2) ﬁnd that this trade-related openness measures is statistically signiﬁ-
cant in a cross-country analysis without ﬁxed country eﬀects, but insigniﬁcant in the
presence of country dummies.21 The latter result corresponds with the ﬁndings of our
analysis, as reported in column (2) of Table 4. Hence, the overall conclusion is that a
trade-based measure is also not able to explain the adjustment in the factor tax mix
that has occurred in OECD countries during the last two decades.
Instead, Winner (2005) uses savings-investment correlations as a proxy for capital mar-
ket openness. His analysis yields a robust negative relationship between this measure
of openness and the ratio of capital to labour taxation, even when country ﬁxed eﬀects
are added.22 Winner bases his empirical analysis on average tax ratios, calculated from
20Note that Slemrod’s (2004) analysis focuses only on the determinants of corporate taxation.
21We report here the results that Bretschger and Hettich (2002) ﬁnd for the conventional trade-
related measure of openness (labelled openness1 in their analysis).
22Winner’s analysis also includes a dynamic speciﬁcation. The results of this model suggest that
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collected tax revenue. Hence, in comparison to our analysis, both the tax measures and
the proxies for capital market integration diﬀer. Savings-investment correlations (as a
proxy for overall capital mobility) and the sectoral composition of output (as a proxy
for the mobility of ﬁrms) thus seem to be complementary measures that are both able
to account for country-speciﬁc changes in the factor tax mix over time.
Turning to other explanatory variables, country size (or GDP) is included in all the
empirical works mentioned above. This variable generally has a positive eﬀect on the
ratio of capital to labour taxation (or on the isolated capital tax rate), but the eﬀect
is signiﬁcant only for a subset of the estimated model speciﬁcations. These results
correspond closely to the ﬁndings of our analysis.
A core variable in our analysis is the share of government consumption in GDP. This
variable is not included in the analyses of Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Winner
(2005). It is incorporated, however, by Slemrod (2004, Table 2), who ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of an increase in government consumption on the statutory corporate tax rate.
This corresponds to the ambiguous sign that the variable γ has on the corporate tax rate
in our analysis [cf. eq. (12)] and implies that an increase in government consumption
will be ﬁnanced largely by an increase in wage taxation. Hence Slemrod’s ﬁnding is
consistent with our result that an increase in government consumption expenditure
lowers the ratio of capital to wage taxation (Tables 4 and 5).
To summarise, there is a considerable consensus in the empirical literature that capital
market integration does indeed change the factor tax mix, in the direction of a reduced
reliance on capital taxes. It is essential, however, to clearly distinguish between a pooled
analysis, where cross-country and time-series eﬀects are simultaneously included, and
an analysis that focuses on explaining the changes over time within a given country
using country ﬁxed eﬀects. Following the latter approach unveils the weaknesses of some
of the conventional measures of capital market integration, which do not contribute to
explaining the changes in the structure of direct taxation which have occurred in OECD
member countries. Additional variables that may account for these changes, as derived
here from a theoretical model, have so far received only scant attention in the empirical
literature. But where such evidence exists, it is compatible with our results.
the downward eﬀect of capital mobility on the capital tax burden has intensiﬁed since the mid-1980s.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have set up a simple model that allows us to derive rigorously a num-
ber of testable hypotheses relating the mix of corporate taxation to wage taxation to a
number of country-speciﬁc variables. In addition to restating some well-known results
from the existing literature on capital tax competition, we have also emphasised two
relationships that have received little attention so far. First, we have shown that in-
creasing the share of multinational ﬁrms’ income in an economy will, other things being
equal, lower the corporate income tax. Second, an increase in government consumption
will increase this country’s relative reliance on wage taxes, at least for a wide range of
‘plausible’ parameter values.
In a second step, we have tested the theoretical predictions using data from 23 OECD
countries for the period 1980–2001. Overall, the empirical results have conﬁrmed the
theoretical results from our simple model. In particular, the share of government con-
sumption turned out to be one core determinant of the factor tax mix in OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, proxying the share of multinationals in the economy by a simple ratio
of value added in the service and manufacturing sectors proved to be a powerful ex-
planatory variable that outperformed traditional openness measures like the share of
international commodity trade or an index of international capital controls.
The limitations of our analysis should also be stressed, however. From a theoretical
perspective, we have postulated a simple median voter model where changes in the
relative factor shares of labour and capital do not aﬀect the political equilibrium. The
prediction from this model that an increase in the share of wage income should reduce
the ratio of capital taxation to labour taxation are not conﬁrmed by our empirical
analysis. This suggests that a more elaborated political economy model is needed. In
the empirical part of the analysis, it would be desirable to have a more direct summary
measure of the value added by mobile, multinational ﬁrms in a given country. We
suspect that such a measure would be a highly suitable proxy for the country-speciﬁc
exposure to the forces of corporate tax competition.
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Table A.1: Data sources and methods
Variable Source Deﬁnition and methodology
Corporate IFS data Statutory tax plus typical local taxes and other
income tax and own surtaxes. Where multiple rates are available, the
rate calculations manufacturing rate is chosen.
Wage tax OECD Taxing Average tax wedge of manufacturing worker on
rate Wages average income. This includes personal income taxes,
employer and employee social security contributions
and payroll taxes. We have taken the average of the
rate for married and single workers. Before 1993, this
is reported biannually, and we use linear interpolation.
pub cons OECD National Public consumption expenditure divided by GDP
Accounts
wage share OECD Economic Wages and salaries divided by GDP
Outlook
GDP OECD National GDP in trillion US$, converted at purchasing
Accounts power parity exchange rates
trade share OECD National The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP
Accounts
cap controls Comparative Index ranging from 0 (closed capital markets) to 4
Welfare States (open capital markets)
Data Set∗
service share OECD STAN Value added in the service sector divided by value
(Structural Ana- added in the manufacturing sector
lysis Database)
FDI stock OECD Inter- Stock of foreign direct investment divided by GDP
national Direct
Investment
world tax World Tax Data Base, Average statutory corporate income tax rate, not
University of Michi- including local taxes, of 70 countries for which
gan Business School, continuous data are available from 1980 to 2001.
own calculations
Notes: - IFS data available from: www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication id=3210
- All OECD data available from: new.sourceoecd.org
- World tax data base available from: www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm
∗Full source: E. Huber, Ch. Ragin, J. D. Stephens, D. Brady, and J. Beckﬁeld, Comparative
Welfare States Data Set, mimeo 2004. Original source of the measure: Quinn (1997).
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Table A.2: Multinational firms in services and manufacturing (1998)
inward FDIa outward FDIb
services manufac- ratio services manufac- ratio
(1) turing (2) (1):(2) (1) turing (2) (1):(2)
Austria 0.14 0.26 0.54 0.04 0.07 0.57
Belgium 0.26 0.47 0.55 0.08 0.08 1.00
Finland 0.15 0.14 1.07 0.20 0.43 0.47
France 0.08 0.16 0.50
Japan 0.01 0.02 0.5 0.07 0.09 0.78
Luxembourg 0.15 0.52 0.29
Netherlands 0.16 0.30 0.53
Norway 0.20 0.17 1.18
Portugal 0.02 0.03 0.67
Sweden 0.19 0.19 1.00
United Kingdom 0.17 0.31 0.55
United States 0.08 0.17 0.47
averagec 0.19 0.26 0.67 0.05 0.09 0.67
a Foreign controlled turnover as a share of total services and manufacturing turnover.
b Turnover of aﬃliates of national ﬁrms located abroad compared with total national turnover.
c unweighted.
Source: OECD (2001): Measuring globalisation. The role of multinationals in OECD
Economies, Volume II: Services, Figures 4 and 7.
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Figure A.1: Country-specific ratios of corporate taxes to wage taxes
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